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Labour and Conservatives’ claims that welfare conditionality is ‘fair’ rely upon an
empirically unsupported assumption that almost-equal opportunities can exist alongside
starkly unequal outcomes. Fifty interviews examined in-depth a diverse sample’s values,
views about work and welfare, and labour market choices. Respondents’ views on
equality strongly inﬂuenced their views on conditionality and what they considered
acceptable labour market behaviour. ‘Alternative’ unemployed respondents, who rejected
politicians’ suggestions they ‘should work’, nevertheless favoured an equal society with
work obligations and often undertook voluntary work. The article concludes that policy-
makers should be more sensitive to Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants’ diverse moralities
and motivations.
I n t roduct ion
Since 1979 the right to unemployment benefit has become contingent upon more and
more conditions (Novak, 1997; Dwyer, 2004), and this trend looks set to continue. Labour
proposed that those who have received Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) continuously for two
years or more must work for their benefit (Wintour, 2008). The Conservatives intend to
make this condition apply to those who have been on JSA for at least two of the last
three years (Conservative Party, 2008) and have pledged that those ‘who refuse to accept
reasonable job offers could forfeit their benefits for up to three years’ (Conservative
Party 2010: 16). The Conservatives’ coalition agreement with the Liberal Democrats
simply asserted that unemployed people’s receipt of benefits will be ‘conditional on
their willingness to work’ (HM Government, 2010: 23).
Both Labour and Conservative Parties consider their approach fair, and feel justified
in insisting that ‘those who can work should work’.1 David Cameron (2008) has said that
moving people ‘off benefits and into work’ is consistent with promoting ‘a compassionate
society that believes in social justice’. Likewise, Labour minister John Hutton (2006) said
it was ‘unfair’ to ask ‘hard working families to pay for the unwillingness of some to take
responsibility to engage in the labour market’.
Yet this talk of fairness comes at a time when the distribution of income and wealth in
the UK is much more unequal than in past decades. The gini-coefficient score for income
inequality, which stayed at around 0.25 in the post-war period, increased to around 0.35
between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, and remains at approximately that level
(Sefton and Sutherland, 2005; OECD, 2008). The figure for the distribution of wealth rose
to around 0.70 in the early 2000s after being in the mid 0.60s for the previous two decades
(Hills, 2004; Dixon and Paxton, 2005). Furthermore, research repeatedly demonstrates
461
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Apr 2013 IP address: 212.219.220.106
Andrew Dunn
the existence of a wide gap between the life chances of babies born into households at
the top and bottom of the income distribution (Bamfield and Brooks, 2006).
This article revisits the issue of whether or not welfare conditionality can be justified in
such an unequal society. The first part discusses Stuart White’s The Civic Minimum (2003),
the most notable recent exposition of the view that conditionality is only acceptable in a
much more equal society than the UK is at present. I argue that politicians’ claims that
conditionality is ‘fair’ rely upon the empirically unsubstantiated assumption that equal (or
almost equal) opportunities are possible in a society of radically unequal outcomes. The
second part presents findings from a study which investigated the impact of values upon
labour market choices. The study provided a unique in-depth examination of a diverse
sample’s views around equality and welfare conditionality. Views about equality were
found to be important in determining views on conditionality and what was considered
morally acceptable labour market behaviour. Most notably, the study explored the values,
atttitudes and behaviour of a group of ‘alternative’ JSA claimants who, echoing White,
rejected the suggestion that they ‘should work’ in a very unequal society. The article
concludes by considering the implications of the empirical findings for welfare policy.
Stuar t Wh i te ’s ‘ j us t i ce as fa i r rec ip roc i t y ’
White is an egalitarian liberal who starts from the premise that the ‘good society’ is one of
mutual concern and respect or, more precisely, one in which individuals exhibit ‘demo-
cratic mutual regard’ (2003: 27). White sets out a philosophy of economic citizenship
appropriate for such a society, whereby citizens who ‘claim the highminimum share of the
social product necessarily available to them . . . have an obligation to make a decent pro-
ductive contribution, proportional to ability, to the community in return’ (2003: 17–18).
This ‘justice as fair reciprocity’, in its ‘ideal’ form, demands a ‘comprehensively
egalitarian society’ (2003: 77) that not only eliminates discrimination on the grounds
of ‘race’, gender etc., but also fully corrects for brute luck disadvantages – which
consist mainly of disadvantageous endowments of external wealth, marketable talent
and educational opportunities. White acknowledges the lack of support for this in the
UK and so, to avoid being ‘unhelpfully utopian’, proposes a ‘non-ideal form of fair
reciprocity’ (p. 78), which guarantees the following egalitarian outcomes: freedom from
poverty, discrimination and exploitation; the opportunity for rewarding and challenging
work; access to external wealth; and minimised educational inequalities (see White,
2003: 90–1).
White contrasts his position with three others (see Table 1, page 5). The ‘New
Right/Libertarian’ philosophy is evident in the Conservatives’ belief that ‘the free market
economy is the fairest way of rewarding people for their efforts’ (Osbourne, 2008). New
Labour literature neatly fits the ‘Centre Left/Communitarian’ philosophy (see Lister, 1998;
Powell 1999; Deacon, 2002; Levitas, 2005; Driver and Martell, 2006). However, the
Parties’ policies do not precisely match the philosophies; Cameron’s Conservatives have
declared support for Centre Left ideas like equal opportunities (Cameron, 2008) and
tackling child poverty (Letwin, 2006), while New Labour’s use of low, means-tested
benefits fits the New Right/Libertarian position. White explains that his own approach is
similar to the Centre-Left/Communitarians in its ‘emphasis on the responsibilities that
accompany citizens’ social rights’ and is similar to Real Libertarians in its belief in
‘economic egalitarianism’ (2003: 17).
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Table 1 Stuart White’s four philosophies of economic citizenship
Philosophy Equality Conditionality
Examples of key
texts
Libertarian/New
Right
Egalitarian
redistribution
infringes rights to
income generated
from one’s body and
abilities.
The state supports the free
market economy by
making welfare benefits
low, means-tested and
conditional upon the
passing of work tests.
Nozick (1974);
Murray (1984)
Communitarian/
Centre Left
The free-market needs
limiting by the state,
which tackles poverty
and social exclusion
to deliver equal
opportunities.
Inequalities in the
‘included’
mainstream are
accepted as they
reflect talent and hard
work.
A ‘contractualist’ matching
of the responsibility to
seek employment with
rights to such goods as
training, education,
health care and benefit
payments.
Etzioni (1995);
Giddens (1998)
Real Libertarian Ideally a
comprehensively
egalitarian society
but, failing that, an
unconditional basic
income.
Conditionality is a
regrettable shift from
Marshallian social
citizenship, towards
promoting labour
discipline while
neglecting other forms
of social contribution –
e.g. unpaid care work.
Van Parijs (1995);
Sevenhuijsen
(1998)
Justice as fair
reciprocity
Ideally a
comprehensively
egalitarian society,
but otherwise at least
abolish the ‘bads’
associated with the
proletarian condition.
All citizens must fulfil a
‘basic work expectation’
to the community, in
proportion to their
ability.
White (2003)
Source: White (2003, chapter 1).
White (2003: 137–9) defends his stance on conditionality against the Real
Libertarians, explaining that the ‘work test’ – which he sees as essential to his favoured
mutually responsible society – is not opposed by leading advocates of social justice like
Marshall (1950) and Rawls (1999), and that Left literature has often equated the voluntarily
unemployed with the idle, share owning capitalist.2
He also defends his ‘non-ideal’ version of ‘justice as fair reciprocity’ against the
possible accusation that it is no more egalitarian than New Labour.White explains that he,
unlike New Labour, agrees with Rawls that talent should go unrewarded as it is ‘arbitrary
from amoral perspective’ (Rawls, 1999: 64, quoted inWhite, 2003: 13), and that hewishes
‘to achieve equality of opportunity (not just a basic level of opportunity)’ (2003: 98).
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While White’s stance on the reward of talent clearly separates him philosophically
from both Labour and Conservatives, his dispute with them over equality of opportunity
is an empirical matter. Equality of opportunity is usually taken to mean an equal ability to
fulfil one’s potential with a given amount of talent and effort (Miller, 2005), and it is well
established that this is not possible in a society of unequal outcomes (Hirsch, 1977; Barry,
2005). Richer parents can buy their children the educational advantage that is so important
in determining their future income. Furthermore, area-based, class-based, gendered and
ethnic cultures are found to strongly influence educational outcomes (Ball, 2003; Reay
et al., 2005), with children severely educationally disadvantaged before they are old
enough to make their own choices (Barry, 2005; Bamfield and Brook, 2006). While
some welfare capitalist societies – a notable example being Sweden – have successfully
minimised these inequalities through redistribution and universal day care provision
for younger children (Esping-Andersen, 2005), such policies are not advocated by New
Labour or the Conservatives. Hence, White’s view that genuine equality of opportunity
cannot exist under present policy arrangements, and instead requires more radical mea-
sures such as the ‘heavy’ taxation of wealth (2003: 199), carries considerable empirical
support.
The s tudy
The research presented here explored in-depth the values, and views about economic
citizenship, of 30 unemployed and 20 employed people. Groups with differing values
(as well as other relevant characteristics) were purposively sampled in order to gain a
deeper understanding of contrasting values and attitudes around work and welfare, and
the relationship between these contrasting values/attitudes and behaviour in the labour
market. This focus on diversity is rare in studies of welfare claimants, and it is widely
acknowledged that UK social policy literature has, until recently, tended to downplay
or neglect individual agency (Williams et al., eds., 1999; Deacon, 2002; Lister, 2004).
Indeed, when UK unemployment was last high enough to make it a major topic of
political debate and social research, even those authors who lamented the treatment of
the unemployed as an homogeneous group (examples include McLaughlin et al., 1989;
White, 1991) went on to recommend examining different categories such as age and
gender – not differences in values or preferred lifestyles. Moreover, qualitative studies
of the unemployed understandably took place in culturally homogeneous, working-class
neighbourhoods (McLaughlin et al., 1989; Jordan et al., 1992). Hence, while lone parents’
culturally diverse ‘gendered moral rationalities’ have been mapped (Duncan and Edwards
1999; Duncan and Irwin, 2004), such work is hitherto absent from UK literature on the
unemployed. This is not the case elsewhere. In the Netherlands, Engbersen et al. (1993)
identified some unemployed people with a ‘traditional’ strong work ethic who diligently
sought employment, and others with an ‘alternative’ work ethic who often preferred to
live on the benefits provided by the relatively permissive and generous Dutch welfare
system of the time.
The following groups were chosen:
Employed with a strong commitment to the ‘work ethic’ (Strong Work Ethic)
Employed, with weak commitment to the ‘work ethic’ (Weak Work Ethic)
Unemployed, with low employability (Low Employability)
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Unemployed, with mainstream values and lifestyles (Mainstream Unemployed)
Unemployed, with alternative values and lifestyles (Alternative Unemployed)
The Alternative unemployed were chosen for their rejection of Protestant Work
Ethic values (see Furnham, 1990) and low interest in material possessions, which,
it was hypothesised, would make them more likely to be voluntarily unemployed.
The Mainstream Unemployed were included because they neither held the Alternative
respondents’ values nor chronically lacked employability as did the Low Employability
group, who usually had low or no qualifications and were homeless or had a criminal
record. The Strong and Weak Work Ethic groups were categorised based on the strength
of their moral preference for paid work over claiming JSA, as moral judgment about paid
work was not usually made without reference to benefit receipt (this was a key finding
which is discussed below).
Respondents were assigned to the five groups after initial questioning or, if it was
unclear which category respondents fitted, after the interviews had taken place. Apart
from their defining characteristics, the five groups were chosen randomly. It was possible
that someone could fit both the Low Employability and Alternative unemployed groups,
but this did not happen. The unemployed groups included both short- and long-term
unemployed. All 30 unemployed were entitled to claim JSA, and 29 did so at the time
of interview. The employed groups included part-time and full-time workers. The sample
was overwhelmingly white, and the 19 women and 31 men, and those of various ages,
were evenly distributed between the five groups.
Thirty-five semi-structured interviews took place in Canterbury, chosen because it
was an affluent city in south-east England at a time of low unemployment (2001–
2), and the rest in the larger and more industrial cities of Bradford, Leeds and York.
Questions covered values and attitudes concerning work, materialism, welfare and social
justice; respondents’ education, household roles and past labour market experiences and
decision-making. Respondents were accessed via street canvassing, outside Canterbury
job centre, via a homeless charity (for some of the ‘Low Employability’ respondents) and,
in the case of some of the ‘Alternative’ respondents, through contacts made during an
earlier project.
F ind ings
The ‘Wea l t h E th i c ’
When respondents moralised in favour of work, they rarely did so without mentioning
the claiming of state benefits – one’s moral duty to the rest of society was to avoid being
a burden on it:
It would be a matter of pride to provide my own money from my labours rather than going to
the dole office. (Strong Work Ethic, Male, 57, Council Worker)
It’s not about laziness, it’s about paying your own way. (StrongWork Ethic, Female, 52, Cleaner)
When respondents were asked whether or not they believed that people with no
financial need either for paid work or for claiming JSA should have to work, a typical
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response was ‘I think they should have a choice’ (Strong Work Ethic, Female, 23, Retail
Manager). Most said that they would choose to work in this circumstance, yet none spoke
of a possible moral obligation to do so:
I would go back to work for my own benefit but I can choose the job that I want to do and the
hours. (Mainstream Unemployed, Male, 58)
This morality around work and claiming unemployment benefits is consistent with
what Kelvin and Jarrett (1985: 104) call the ‘wealth ethic’ – ‘to make or have sufficient
wealth not to have to depend on others’. As they explain, ‘provided one has enough
money to be independent, there is certainly no moral obligation to work’ (1985: 104). It
also matches Mead’s (2005: 192) description of US public opinion:
Americans seem to combine a communitarian ethic for the poor with a Lockean attitude above
that level . . . they insist that the dependant display recognised civilities such as working . . . But
above the welfare level, individuals . . . need only obey the law.
Twenty-nine respondents supported the Wealth Ethic (all 10 Strong Work Ethic, 6
Weak Work Ethic, 7 Low Employability, 6 Mainstream Unemployed, and no Alternative
Unemployed). The 12 who opposed it on egalitarian grounds consisted of all the
Alternative respondents and two of the Weak Work Ethic group. Of the remaining
nine, some held views which were unclear or fitted neither category, while others were
unfamiliar with moral debates around work and welfare.
All 50 respondents had done paid work, while 44 had experienced unemployment.
Their labour market decisions reflected their unique circumstances and individual
preferences about jobs, including the emphasis they placed on the importance of money.
However, their views regarding the Wealth Ethic dictated the parameters of what they
considered morally acceptable labour market behaviour. Claiming JSA without seeking
employment was morally unacceptable to the 29 who supported the Wealth Ethic,
whereas it was morally acceptable to the 12 who opposed the Wealth Ethic on egalitarian
grounds (although the Wealth Ethic supporters occasionally reported failing to live up to
their expressed morality, and the Alternatives sometimes hinted that they felt ashamed of
their unemployment). The two categories of respondent are discussed in turn, in order
to explain why their views regarding the wealth ethic (and hence what they considered
acceptable labour market behaviour) differed.
The Wea l t h E th i c suppo r t e r s
In order to explain why Wealth Ethic supporters did not, like White and the Alternatives,
insist upon greater equality as a prerequisite of their support for welfare conditionality,
we require knowledge of whether or not they considered contemporary UK society fair,
and how this in turn related to their commitment to the Wealth Ethic.
The Wealth Ethic supporters all said it was fair that hard work and talent should be
rewarded. They agreed that the unemployed should be entitled to state benefits and help
finding jobs. They expressed much dismay at the unfairness of what academics refer to as
the ‘unemployment trap’ (see Gebauer and Vobruba, 2003), whereby unemployed people
466
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Apr 2013 IP address: 212.219.220.106
Welfare Conditionality, Inequality and Unemployed People with Alternative Values
are unable to increase their incomes by taking attainable jobs. Only the most vehement
Wealth Ethic supporters condemned those who chose to remain on benefits when in
the ‘unemployment trap’. Most, like Strong Work Ethic, Female, 19, Shop Assistant, who
said she would choose to work due to ‘the boredom factor and just because I feel that I
should work’ did not condemn others for not doing so ‘as long as they’re actively seeking
work’.
Respondents considered the distribution of income and wealth in the UK to be at
least tolerably fair. Hard work, talent and luck were the most popular reasons given for
people reaching the top of the income distribution. Talk of social injustice was largely
confined to discussion of breaches of existing anti-discrimination legislation and to the
very rich being ‘born with a silver spoon’ (Strong Work Ethic, Female, 35, Recruitment
Officer). Reference to educational inequalities was confined to occasional mentions of
the funding gap between private and state schools. Moreover, respondents downplayed
the relationship between educational attainment and subsequent earnings, often citing
business acumen as the main route to a higher income (like Lewis and White’s (2006)
respondents, they often named Richard Branson as an example of someone who had
reached the top through effort and talent). Thus, consistent with findings elsewhere (Sefton,
2005; Taylor-Gooby, 2005), while a majority believed the UK to be too unequal (owing to
their resentment towards a privileged minority at the top), support for redistribution was
limited, largely due to fears that it rewards the undeserving.
Older, working-class, and less educated respondents tended to be the Wealth
Ethic’s most vehement advocates. Six in particular, divided equally between the Low
Employability and Strong Work Ethic groups, asserted views on welfare and gendered
work roles in a basic, unelaborated way, with which it was assumed all right-thinking
people would agree (this is consistent with past research on working-class communities –
examples include Turner et al., 1985; Wight, 1993). They often said the Wealth Ethic
had been ‘instilled’ in them (Strong Work Ethic, Female, 52, Cleaner). Their intransigence
about social standards contrasted with younger respondents who typically defended the
right of individuals and groups to lead an alternative lifestyle, providing they did not
breach the Wealth Ethic.
Given their lack of education, the traditionalist respondents were at considerable risk
of unemployment, and spoke with sadness about past experiences of joblessness. One
said he was ‘willing to take almost anything [he] was capable of’ when unemployed,
and contrasted this approach with that of the voluntarily unemployed, of whom he said
‘our taxes are higher because they won’t work’ (Strong Work Ethic, Male, 64, Cleaner).
While his willingness to take ‘almost anything’ is questionable (his account suggested
he followed traditional gendered norms), the fiercest supporters of the Wealth Ethic
were nevertheless those who reported taking the most drastic steps to avoid claimant
unemployment.
The same respondent described himself as an ‘out and out socialist’ – thus
exemplifying a recurring finding, that egalitarianism did not necessarily temper
respondents’ support for the Wealth Ethic. This appeared to be because they saw the
Wealth Ethic as a cast-iron social rule, whereas the issue of distributive justice was
considered debatable. It might also have been because resentment at paying taxes to
fund the voluntarily unemployed stemmed from the same sense of economic injustice
that led them to become socialists. Perhaps it also stemmed from their stated belief that
opportunities (if not outcomes) were at least tolerably equal, which in turn appeared to
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be attributable to their failure to grasp the true extent of social inequality, owing to relying
upon lived experiences when forming perceptions of social reality. This has been found
elsewhere (Runciman, 1966; Golding and Middleton, 1982), and was a view expressed
by one of a sub-group of five highly educated and more questioning respondents (three
were in the Weak Work Ethic group and two in the Mainstream Unemployed group), who
were the Wealth Ethic’s least vehement supporters:
The world of the very rich is located in a very different space to the world of the poor, and most
people don’t even quite recognise what is going on. (Mainstream Unemployed, Male, 48)
The five were accustomed to higher incomes and jobs they enjoyed, and therefore
viewed unemployed people as unfortunate victims who typically lived in ‘poverty’ (see
also Golding and Middleton, 1982; Hills and Lelkes, 1999). These ‘liberal’ attitudes to
poverty, popular among middle-class professionals (Park et al., 2007), lessened the shame
this sub-group reported feeling when unemployed.
The A l t e r na t i ves
The Alternative respondents rejected the Wealth Ethic because they strongly believed
that UK society is unjust. They had often been employed, either when they needed
the money or found work they considered interesting. Of the 12, two had jobs at the
time of interview. A further three held regular voluntary work positions. However, their
morality and related lifestyle preferences led them to be much likelier than the Wealth
Ethic supporters to choose to claim JSA instead of doing paid work. While five had fairly
normal expenditure patterns, none could be called consumerist, and none indicated
that they were likely to be enticed into low-paid jobs by small economic incentives.
Their generally higher levels of educational attainment (six Alternatives had degrees,
compared with just nine of the other 38 respondents) meant that they tended to find
low-status jobs uninteresting. However, their career paths were interrupted by periods of
unemployment, so their academic qualifications did not translate well into employability.
With one exception (Male, 42, Unemployed), none had dependants, and this meant
they did not have to think of the material needs of others when making labour market
decisions.
Most of the Alternatives’ complaints about inequality focused upon wages and
conditions in low-status jobs. For example, a man who had been unemployed for over a
year, who said ‘I don’t really mind [being unemployed]’, explained why he would only
seek employment ‘if there was a real job’:
I can go out and do an honest day’s work for somebody who appreciates what I’m doing and
its quite enjoyable, if I am doing something for somebody I do it well and I like it if I am
appreciated . . . My mate got a job as a cleaner to get the dole off his back, and hated it, and the
people looked down on him and he’s thinking ‘the bastards, they’re making so much money out
of my labour and paying me nothing’ . . . If somebody is being paid minimum wage somebody
is being ripped off. I’d rather not have any money. (Male, 42, Unemployed)
Another explained why he had felt exploited in employment and comfortable about
claiming JSA:
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People owning land and companies at the expense of others, I think it’s disgraceful. You’re only
lining somebody else’s pocket, the work that you do you don’t get sufficient rewards for it . . .
the friends and acquaintances I had were claiming benefits and the feeling towards it was you
should claim and you should get everything out of the government. (Male, 23, Waiter)
They often directly opposed New Labour’s argument that citizens have a moral
obligation to contribute through work:
If the community itself is running on immoral principle and it says to you that you should join
their morality, to assist them in an immoral act, then no it doesn’t work. If it was really moral,
and really to the benefit of other people, then yes I’d say that I agree with that. (Male, 47,
Unemployed).
Similarly, another argued that the ‘draught proofing’ she had done as part of an
employment training course was a positive contribution, whereas her earlier work for a
company involved in ‘selling coal’ was not:
The attitude that if you’re not in paid work anything you do doesn’t count, that’s what gets me
. . . you could be in a job that is socially or ecologically destructive. (Female, 33, Unemployed)
She was one of ten who agreed that welfare conditionality would be acceptable in
an equal society (one of the remaining two was suspicious of conditionality per se, while
the other’s view was unclear). Only one Alternative respondent focused critical attention
upon unequal opportunities rather than unequal outcomes. She bemoaned the fact that it
was ‘women’ who had ‘got to do’ cleaning jobs, and suggested that politicians believed
that equal opportunities existed because they ‘don’t come from a working-class housing
estate, where there’s no money going, there’s no prospects, there’s no education’ (Female,
28, Unemployed).
The Alternative respondents’ accounts of their voluntary work shed light on their
moralities and preferences, and hence offered insights into why economic enticements
and moral persuasion have been ineffective in mobilising them into jobs. Some echoed
feminist concerns about society undervaluing unpaid caring work (see Sevenhuijsen,
1998; Lister, 2001; Williams, 2001):
When I’m doing [voluntary work] some people would define as idle, but I actually counsel
women and I’m not getting paid for it. What some people might do paid – stand on a till, which
is more important? . . . what I’m doing is far more important . . . I love it, I can never imagine
not working there . . . I would rather work at [voluntary organisation] underpaid than work in
a factory for forty pound an hour. (Female, 28, Unemployed)
Another was asked if she thought she could find a paid job:
I certainly could, I know that . . . If something I fancy comes along I am fit and able to work
and at the moment I don’t want to. I’ve got no dependents. Obviously I couldn’t wander down
to, let’s say, Debenhams, pick out what I like, but . . . I’m not materialistic . . . If somebody said
to me em ‘look, you get exactly the same, your standard of living won’t change etc etc but
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you would be required to work in the dogs home or animal sanctuary’ or something like that I
would do it willingly. In fact I do do it willingly for nothing. (Female, 39, Unemployed)
This combination of low materialism and an unwillingness to devote time and energy
to uninteresting full-time work was shared by the other voluntary worker, who had been
unemployed since leaving University a year earlier. He spoke of ‘dull’ low-status jobs,
and said ‘I don’t like a forty hour week, I can live on less money than that’ (Male,
26, Unemployed). He worked voluntarily in a charity book shop, which he considered
‘helpful’ to others.
Conc lus ion
The 50 interviews offered a unique in-depth examination of a diverse sample’s values
and views on equality and welfare conditionality, and how this in turn impacted on
their labour market choices. Respondents’ views on equality were crucial in determining
the parameters of what they considered morally acceptable labour market behaviour.
While the ‘Alternative’ respondents rejected the suggestion they ‘should work’ and were
most disposed to voluntary unemployment, they were willing to undertake voluntary
work, and said they would support work obligations if society was equal. Yet, ironically,
the non-alternative respondents, who broadly supported New Labour’s policies and
communitarian slogans, endorsed Wealth Ethic beliefs which echoed the individualism
communitarianism opposes – their understanding of obligation by the community stopped
at not being a burden on it. Therefore, while New Labour’s ‘rights and responsibilities’
rhetoric, in ‘sound bite’ form, appeals to all but those at the political extremes, support
for the philosophy that underpins it appears to be much more limited.
While the diversity of values and related motivations among unemployed people
found here has been hitherto overlooked or downplayed, lone mothers’ diverse ‘gendered
moral rationalities’ have been identified, and this has led toNew Labour’s ‘welfare to work’
policies being accused of containing ‘rationality’ and ‘morality’ mistakes (see Barlow
et al., 2002). The ‘rationality mistake’ refers to policy-makers’ misplaced assumption that
economic considerations are paramount in lone parents’ choices between caring and
paid work (research on the unemployed has also found that small economic incentives
have negligible employment status effects – e.g. McLaughlin et al., 1989). The ‘morality
mistake’ is made after economic incentives and child care provision fails to entice some
lone mothers into employment, and policy-makers initially wrongly assume that this is
due to their lack of awareness of policy. When lone mothers still fail to respond in the
intended way after being told of policy, they are then wrongly assumed to be irresponsible,
when in fact they are making a moral choice to stay at home to look after their children.
Something similar to the rationality and morality mistakes might be happening in the case
of unemployed Alternative respondents, as they have failed to respond in the anticipated
way to New Labour’s moral persuasion and to its ‘make work pay’ policies such as the
minimum wage. In this case, policy-makers might wrongly assume that Alternatives are
unwilling to contribute to the good of the community.
Research here and elsewhere indicates that the radical redistribution White and the
Alternative respondents want is highly unlikely in the near future. However, existing policy
could be reformed by providing ‘alternatives’ with what they would consider meaningful
work. The voluntary sector and environmental New Deal options were welcome in this
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connection, although they were criticised as second rate, temporary alternatives to proper
employment (Millar, 2000). Perhaps by allowing the ‘alternatives’ to declare their moral
position in Job Centre interviews, and giving policies like the voluntary and environmental
options permanence and better pay, ‘alternatives’ could be allowed to increase their
incomes while making a contribution to society consistent with their values (this is not
far removed from current policy debates, as the creation of ‘green’ jobs has been mooted
by Gordon Brown as a way of tackling recessional unemployment). Such a reform is
potentially popular – as the Alternative respondents’ right to lead their chosen lifestyle was
respected by many other respondents, providing they were not voluntarily unemployed,
and it would not be viewed as a ‘soft option’ if it was made unattractive to those who do
not share the Alternative respondents’ organisational commitment and modest material
standards.
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1 Both Tony Blair and David Cameron have used this exact phrase – Blair writing in the Daily Mail
on 10th February 1999, and Cameron (2008) in a speech on 8th January 2008.
2 An in-depth discussion of the debate between White and others on welfare citizenship is beyond
the scope of this article (see instead Mead and Beem, eds., 2005), as is discussion of detailed critiques of
White’s work (for example, Fitzpatrick, 2005).
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